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Using data from community-based water services in Sri Lanka and India, 
this paper shows first that: (a) improved household health and reduced 
water collection times are associated with better service design and 
construction: (b) well-designed services involve more community members 
in the design process and final decision-making about service type; and 
(c) well-constructed services have effective mechanisms to monitor 
household contributions to construction.  The paper then shows that these 
service-level institutions are endogenously determined: in communities 
with higher levels of social capital--in particular, with more active 
community groups and associations--design participation is more likely to 
be high and monitoring mechanisms are more likely to be in place.  This 
suggests a way to place an economic value on this form of social capital in 
the context of water projects: as the net present value of the marginal 
increase in health associated with active civic associations.  These results 
suggest that designers and supervisors of community-based water projects 
need to pay attention to the prevailing levels of social capital as one of the 
factors that will influence performance.  When targeting a range of 
communities, the allocation of investment resources for water services 
programs may need to be adjusted to take into account the lack of this 
form of social capital in some villages:  possible adjustments include 
increased investments in social mobilization efforts (for example, through 
the strengthening of local organizations) and in more direct supervision to 
oversee system performance. 





As she fills her water vessel at a standpost and then balances it carefully 
on her head, Arpana, a mother of five, describes how clean water arrived 
to her community.  Three years ago, a government extension worker had 
informed her and her neighbors that they could get a new water service if 
they contributed cash or labor for its construction and took responsibility 
for its operation and maintenance.  Arpana, with most of the members of 
her women’s group, attended sessions where community leaders led a 
discussion on the selection of the type of service and locations of the new 
standposts.  Her husband also contributed labor to the construction of the 
new service.  Now, she and her friends who use the water pay a monthly 
user fee, and a caretaker, a neighbor, looks after operation and 
maintenance. “My friends and I are very satisfied with this new water 
service,” she notes.  “It has cut the time I spend daily fetching water by 
over an hour, and my two youngest children no longer suffer from ‘loose 
stools’.” 
  
In another community, Madhumitha is also hauling water from a 
standpost financed by the same government program. Madhumitha 
complains that, in her community, water from the standpost is not 
available many days because of leaks, so she and her daughter often still 
collect water from the local spring.  She also complains about the 
inconvenient location of the standposts.  As far as she knows, the views of 
community members about possible sites were never solicited.  “We have a 
caretaker who is supposed to maintain the system”, Madhumitha says, 
“but he is not doing his job properly.”  But no one in this community 
seems to care.  “Everybody just takes care of their own business and waits 
for others to act.  Anyway, taking care of the water service is not my 
responsibility,” she sighs, and slowly walks away.  
 
Development agencies and donors currently promote a community-based 
approach to the provision of rural water services.  This demand-responsive 
approach calls for a joint effort by community members and government staff in 
service design, construction, and operation and maintenance (O&M).  Community 
members are typically expected to participate in the design process: in particular, 
to choose collectively the type and the level of service based on their willingness   2 
 
to pay.  In addition, communities may be asked to contribute cash or labor to 
construction, and take care of operation and maintenance.
1  However, the 
outcomes of this approach have greatly varied, so development practitioners now 
wonder: “Under what circumstances is the community-based approach more 
likely to succeed?”   
The objective of this paper is to start unraveling that question by analyzing 
selected institutional determinants of the impact and performance of community-
based water services.  Using quantitative and qualitative data from 1,088 rural 
households and 50 water committees, the paper investigates how service rules and 
practices, social capital, and governmental and non-governmental organization 
(NGO) institutions affect the impact and performance of services supported by 
three World Bank-financed projects in Sri Lanka and India.
 2  The paper focuses 
on measuring and econometrically analyzing selected aspects of project design 
and implementation, such as the importance of community participation in service 
design and decision-making.
3  This paper is also one of the first to measure and 
econometrically analyze the effect of social capital on the impact of community-
based water services.
4 
II.  Impact and Performance of Projects in Sri Lanka and India 
A.  Community-based Projects in Sri Lanka and India 
  In the early 1990s, three community-based rural water projects were 
prepared and implemented in Sri Lanka and in two states of India--Karnataka and 
Maharashtra.  Their objectives were to provide potable water to selected small rural 




These projects adopted different ‘community-based’ strategies.  The Sri 
Lankan households were supposed to contribute 20 percent of construction costs, 
either in cash or labor.  The Indian households, by contrast, did not formally 
contribute to construction: water services were fully financed through government 
grant funds.  In Sri Lanka and Karnataka, communities were supposed to take 
responsibility for O&M (including the levying of household tariffs to cover O&M 
costs).  In Maharashtra, by contrast, district and local governments were supposed to 
take formal responsibility for O&M. 
B.  Impact and Performance 
To analyze the impact and performance of water services provided by these 
projects, data were collected from 50 communities.  Quantitative data were collected 
through a survey of 1088 households and 50 water committees.
6  Qualitative data 
were gathered through focus group interviews with community members and 
interviews with local government officials.   
  Analysis of these data indicates that the impact and performance of these 
water services have been mixed.  Means and standard deviations of several 
indicators of service impact and performance are reported in Table 1.  Two types 
of self-reported household-level impact indicators are used: indicators of improved 
health and of time savings.  ‘Improved health’ and ‘decreased incidence of 
diarrhea’ indicate, respectively, that the family’s health has improved and that the 
incidence of diarrhea has decreased since the implementation of the new water 
service.  ‘Change of collection time’ indicates the daily change (in minutes) for   4 
 
collecting water.
7  Performance variables indicate project achievements at the 
design, construction, and O&M stages.  ‘Satisfied with service design’, based on 
self-reported household-level responses, indicates that a household was satisfied 
with service design.  ‘Good quality construction’, ‘no construction defects’, ‘non-
colored water’, and ‘non-turbid water’, based on technical evaluations of the 
system by the community water committee, indicates services with these 
characteristics. 
  The results suggest that the projects in India have had a greater positive 
impact on health than the project in Sri Lanka.    Fifty-four percent of households in 
Maharashtra reported that their family’s health has improved, as opposed to 45 
percent in Karnataka and 36 percent in Sri Lanka. The reduction in the incidence of 
diarrhea was highest in Karnataka, and about the same in Sri Lanka and 
Maharashtra.
8 
Also, projects in India have resulted in large time-savings.  In Karnataka and 
Maharashtra, households reduced daily collection time by 62.6 and 53.9 minutes, 
respectively.  The respective reduction in Sri Lanka was 40.6 minutes.  The within-
project differences were also large (as indicated by the relatively large standard 
deviations).  For example, in the two Indian projects, 10 percent of households 
report that they still spend two hours or more collecting water after the project has 
been implemented.   
Many performance indicators , however, suggest that the performance of the 
Sri Lankan project has been superior.  For example, 86 percent of households in Sri 
Lanka were satisfied with service design, as opposed to 71 percent and 45 percent,   5 
 
respectively, in the Indian projects.  The average quality of water delivered was 
highest in Sri Lanka. (although the average quality of construction was highest in 
Karnataka.)  
How can improved health be higher among households in Maharashtra if 
the project has worse performance?  Likewise, how can improved health and time 
savings be lower among the Sri Lankan households compared to the Indian 
households, despite generally better performance?  The health impact results may 
be explained by lower initial health conditions in Maharashtra than in Karnataka 
and Sri Lanka: households that did not use a project-financed water system had 
significantly higher incidence of diarrhea in Maharashtra (23%) than in Karnataka 
(13%) and much lower incidence and medical treatment of diarrhea in Sri Lanka.
9  
Accordingly, the results in Table 1 are consistent with decreasing returns to health 
interventions: as a result of the same intervention, households with better initial 
health experiencing smaller health improvements than households with worse 
initial health.  Likewise, the absolute time savings in Sri Lanka project were lower 
because the pre-project collection times were significantly lower than in the 
Indian projects: 76 minutes as opposed to 147 and 129 minutes, respectively.    
C.  Two case studies  
  The variation of performance and impacts was confirmed by qualitative 
beneficiary assessments.  Gallella and Passaramulla, two communities served by 
the Sri Lankan project, provide good examples.   
  In Gallella, the new water service provided connections to 214 households 
that, prior to the project, had consumed water from unprotected wells, springs or   6 
 
streams.  As service design began, community members, collaborating with 
government and NGO representatives, agreed that household connections be 
provided and that the connection cost will depend on household distance from the 
main pipeline.  Households contributed about 43 percent of total construction costs 
(well above the required 20 percent) in the form of unskilled labor. As the project 
began, the water committee in Gallella --which had many pre-existing community 
groups and civic activities -- coordinated community participation, monitored 
household construction contributions, and hired caretakers to handle routine 
maintenance.  The committee established clear procedures for tariff collection to 
cover O&M expenses: caretakers collect monthly fees and retain written records 
of payments.  Ninety percent of households pay the required fee, which is the 
highest recovery rate among the surveyed communities, and households get 
together monthly to clean the water tank.    Overall, water services in Gallella 
have had substantial impacts.  Twenty-one percent of households report that the 
incidence of diarrhea has decreased, and the time-saving for women has been 
dramatic: an average daily reduction of an hour.  
In Passaramulla, only one pipe-borne gravity system was in operation three 
years after service implementation.  Seven other systems were in place but 
inoperable; many others were incomplete.  As service design began, a local NGO 
was hired to mobilize the community and to help to launch a water committee. 
The local government failed to monitor the efforts of this NGO, which were half-
hearted: staff members conducted social-mobilization programs poorly and 
remained detached from the community.  They managed to establish a water   7 
 
committee but did not ensure that committee members had adequate information 
and training.  The committee did not organize monitoring and quality control of 
construction, which resulted in defective construction work.  The subsequent 
performance of the water committee has been poor.  Committee members rarely 
meet, and financial records have been haphazardly kept.  Further, operations have 
not been transparent: while most households do not receive any water, the 
committee chairman has a working household connection.  The water service in 
Passaramulla ranks as the worst in Sri Lanka, and with very poor performance, it 
has had little impact.   
III.  Determinants of Impact and Performance: The Framework 
 
The community-based approach to water delivery calls for collaborative 
design and construction among community members, government officials, and 
NGO staff.  Their incentives will determine whether, in practice, they actually 
collaborate, and institutions affect these incentives.  In the delivery of community-
based water services, institutions are the formal and informal rules and practices 
that govern behavior of different groups.
10  By limiting opportunistic behavior, 
they can hold the groups to their commitments in the design, construction, and 
O&M of water services, thereby improving service performance and impact.  
Figure 1 illustrates a chain of causality from three sets of institutions--
service rules and practices, social capital, and governmental and NGO rules and 
practices -- to service performance and impact.  Each box in Figure 1 contains a list 
of indicators and proxies used in this paper to measure these determinants (as well 
as non-institutional determinants.)     8 
 
First, water service performance will impact household health and time-
saving (link 1).  A well-designed, well-constructed, and well-maintained water 
service that is conveniently located for most households and provides a constant 
flow of clean water is likely to improve household health and reduce water 
collection time.   
  Second, service rules and practices water will influence service 
performance (link 2).  In community-based water services, users, in collaboration 
with government officials and NGO staff, are expected to craft rules and practices 
about user participation in decision-making, design, construction, and O&M; 
monitoring of participation and usage; and sanctions to deter non-compliance.
11   
Mechanisms such as monitoring and sanctioning procedures, for example, limit 
free riding and provide incentives for community members and other stakeholders 
to hold to their commitments and contribute the required inputs to the design, 
construction, and O&M of water services.
12     
  Third, social capital is likely to influence the existence and effectiveness of 
service rules and practices (link 3).  Social capital refers to the norms and networks 
that facilitate collective action.
13  Community-level social capital is likely to help 
community members to craft and enforce the service rules that govern the design, 
construction, and O&M.  The collective demand for the type and level of services is 
more likely to be clearly expressed when community members are accustomed to 
working together, where leaders are accountable, and where all stakeholders have a 
voice.  Water users groups are more likely to succeed in communities with cohesive 
community groups and regular civic activities.  Formal and informal social ties deter   9 
 
community members from free riding and constrain community leaders from 
shirking and expropriating funds. 
  Fourth, governmental and NGO institutions are also likely to affect the 
existence and effectiveness of service rules (link 4).  Government officials and NGO 
staff helped to implement these projects: facilitating the establishment of a 
functioning water committee; assuring that communities could make informed 
decisions about service selection; overseeing construction quality; ensuring that 
selected community members had adequate training in hygiene and financial 
management; and verifying that the service caretaker had access to spare parts and 
tools.  
Finally, non-institutional determinants are also likely to affect the existence 
and effectiveness of service rules (link 5).
 14  These include household assets, 
household size, level of human capital, and environmental conditions.  For example, 
the availability of alternative water source will affect a community’s willingness to 
craft effective system rules and practices.
15  
IV.  Determinants of Performance and Impact: Empirical 
Evidence 
 
  Does the framework presented in the previous section hold in practice?  
This section provides empirical evidence for the linkages in the framework, using 
data from the household and water committee surveys.
16 
  A.  Proximate determinants of impact   
  The first link in the framework ties service performance to impact.  To 
estimate the proximate determinants of health impacts, begin with an econometric   10 
 
model based on the following relationship: 
  H ij* = β 0 + Djβ 1 + Cjβ 2 + Xijββββ 3 + ε ij,        (1) 
where Hij* is a latent random variable for household i in community j which is 
some measure of the changed health of the household since the implementation of 
a community-based water service.  Assume that Hij* is a linear function of a set of 
non-stochastic independent variables and an error term (ε ij).  These covariates 
include (as discussed in the previous sections): Dj, design performance of the 
water service in community j; Cj, construction performance of the water service in 
community j; and Xij, a vector of household-specific characteristics. 
    The dichotomous variable ‘improved health,’ is used as the dependent 
variable (with Probit estimation) to test the relationship presented in equation (1), 
because the available data do not include continuous measures of the change of 
household health.
17  The community-level independent variables used to test these 
relationships (summarized in Appendix Table 1) are ‘community design 
satisfaction’, the share of households in each community that were satisfied with 
project design; and ‘good quality construction’, a dummy variable for well-built 
water systems.  The household-level independent variables are ‘hygiene training’, 
a dummy variable for households that have attended a hygiene class; ‘household 
size’, the number of residents in the household; and ‘household assets’, a 
composite index of household durable goods.
18 
    The results of testing the linkage between performance and health 
impacts (equation 1), are listed in Table 2 and summarized as follows:
19 
•  Improving community satisfaction with service design enhances the service’s   11 
 
health impact.  ‘Community design satisfaction’ is a significant and positive 
determinant of improved health in all three projects.  Based on the standard 
deviations reported in Appendix Table 1 and the change in probabilities 
reported in Table 2, a one-standard deviation increase in ‘community design 
satisfaction’ is associated with an increase in the probability of improved 
health of 0.09 in Sri Lanka, 0.13 in Karnataka, and 0.11 in Maharashtra..
20  
•  Ensuring that water services are well constructed enhances the service’s health 
impact.  ‘Good quality construction’ is a significant and positive determinant 
of improved health in Sri Lanka and Maharashtra (and positive in 
Karnataka).
21  A change from bad quality (the presence of serious construction 
defects) to good quality (the absence of serious construction defects) 
construction is associated with an increase in the probability of improved 
health of 0.13 in Sri Lanka and 0.18 in Maharashtra.
22   
•  Providing hygiene training (or ensuring that hygiene training is provided by 
other sources) enhances the service’s health impact.  Enrollment in a hygiene 
class is associated with an increase in the probability of improved health of 
0.13 in Sri Lanka and 0.20 in Maharashtra.
23   
•  Non-institutional household variables (household size and assets) are not 
significant determinants of improved health in any of the three projects.  This 
is true also of indicators (not reported here) such as household demographics 
and wealth
24 and the type of previous drinking water source used by the 
household (for example, hand-dug well or spring).
25 
  A similar econometric framework is adopted to estimate the proximate   12 
 
determinants of time-saving impacts.  In this case, the econometric model is based 
on the following relationship: 
  T ij = α 0 + Djα 1 + Xijαααα 3 + η ij,        (2) 
where Tij is a continuous measure of the time-saving of household i in community 
j.
26  The estimation procedure must account for the fact that  time savings are 
likely to be greater in households in which the pre-project collection times are 
significantly higher, as discussed before.  Accordingly, using the logarithm of 
time-saving as the measure of Tij allows one to estimate the percentage change of 
time-saving per household.
27    
  The results of testing the linkage between performance and time savings 
(equation 2)  are listed in Table 3 and  summarized as follows: 
•  Improving community satisfaction with service design reduces water 
collection times.  ‘Community design satisfaction’ is a significant and positive 
determinant of time-saving in all three projects.  A one-standard deviation 
increase in ‘community design satisfaction’ is associated with a decrease of 
collection time of 19 percent in Sri Lanka, 45 percent in Karnataka, and 32 
percent in Maharashtra.  Based on the means of the pre-project collection 
times, households, on average, will save 15, 67, and 41 minutes, respectively, 
with such an increase.   
•  The determinants of household time savings – based on a community-level 
decision about the placement of a new water system – are not at the household 
level.  With the exception of ‘household size’ in Karnataka and ‘hygiene class’ 
in Maharashtra
28, household variables are not significant determinants of time-  13 
 
saving.  Again, this is true of the variables reported here, as well as alternative 
household indicators (not reported here).  
  Overall, the results in this section suggest that well-designed and well-
constructed water services are likely to improve household health, and that well-
designed water services are likely to lower collection times.  They also underline 
the importance of providing hygiene classes in conjunction with a water project 
for improving household health.  While these conclusions are certainly not ground 
breaking, these results allow one to establish the statistical significance and 
relative magnitudes of the importance of well-designed and well-constructed 
water services across three different projects.
29  More importantly, these results 
allow one to test econometrically the less explored linkages of this framework: 
how institutions underlie the performance indicators.        
  B.  Institutional determinants of performance 
Does community participation and decision-making lead to higher 
satisfaction with service design, as suggested by the framework?  To answer this 
question, three household-level dummy variables were created from survey 
questions about the service design process. First, ‘local initiation’ indicates that 
community members, as opposed to government officials or other outsiders, had 
the original idea to build the water system.  Second, ‘design participation’ 
indicates that the household participated in service design.  Third, ‘local decision-
making’ reflects that community members, as opposed to government officials or 
other outsiders, made the final decision about what type of system to build.
30 
Table 4 reports results from probit estimates of the household-level   14 
 
determinants of ‘satisfaction with service design’, with community fixed effects.  
The results can be summarized as follows
31:   
•  Households are no more satisfied with service design when the original idea to 
build a system comes from community leaders rather than from outsiders.  
•  User participation in design leads to greater satisfaction with service design.  
A discrete change from not participating to participating leads to an increase 
in the probability of being satisfied with service design of 0.196, 0.253, and 
0.419 in Sri Lanka, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, respectively.
32   
•  Letting locals make the  decision about the system type leads to greater 
satisfaction with service design.  A discrete change from stating that local 
decision-making did not prevail to stating that it did leads to an increase in the 
respective probabilities of 0.191, 0.322, and 0.540.   
  These results conform to the analytical framework.  Households are more 
likely to be satisfied with service design when they have participated in the design 
process and when the community makes the final decision about service type.  
This is true within each project and within each community (given the use of 
community fixed effects), despite different approaches to service design among 
the projects.  In addition, these results indicate that the initiation of well-designed 
services can begin from outside or inside of the community, as long as local 
participation in design and decision-making is ensured. 
  What are the institutional determinants of good construction?  Is 
construction better when household contributions are monitored and sanctions 
against misconduct are imposed, as suggested by the framework?  Since ‘good   15 
 
quality construction’ is a community-level variable, the sample size for addressing 
these questions econometrically must be 50, the number of communities in the 
sample.  Table 5 lists the within-project associations between ‘good quality 
construction’ and two indicators of service rules and practices. ‘Construction 
monitoring’ is the community share of households that said that the required 
construction contributions (cash or labor) were monitored by other community 
members.  ‘Construction sanctions’ is the community share of households that said 
that households that did not contribute their share were charged a financial 
penalty.
33 
  The analysis yields the following results about the determinants of ‘good 
quality construction’: 
•  Existence of monitoring mechanisms leads to better quality construction.  A 
one-standard deviation increase in ‘construction monitoring’ increases the 
probability of ‘good quality construction’ by 0.38.   
•  Existence of construction sanctions does not measurably improve construction 
quality.
34   
  Overall, the results in this sub-section show that community participation 
and decision-making in service design lead to well-designed services, and 
monitoring of household contributions to construction lead to better-constructed 
services.   
  C.  Social capital and service rules 
Finally, the framework suggests that existence of service rules depends on 
social capital.  This section tests if social capital is a significant determinant of   16 
 
‘design participation’ and ‘construction monitoring’.  
  An econometric model based on the following relationship is used to 
assess the influence of social capital on service rules: 
 P ij* = θ 0 + Sijθ 1 + Xijθ 2 + Xjθ 3 + µ ij ,                 
(3) 
where Pij* is a latent random variable for of household i in community j 
which is some measure of the intensity
35 of design participation; Sij is a measure 
of household-level social capital; Xij and Xj are vectors of household and 
community characteristics that could affect the participation decision, and µ ij is an 
error term.  The dichotomous variable ‘design participation’ is used as the 
dependent variable (with Probit estimation) to test the relationship presented in 
equation (3), because the available data do not include continuous measures of the 
intensity of design participation (for example, number of hours spent at a 
community meeting). 
The primary indicator of social capital used is the ‘social capital index’, a 
composite index of the quantity and quality of local groups (based on the ‘Putnam 
index’ in Narayan and Pritchett 1999), that attempts to capture the underlying 
behavior of interest: that a household has established a pattern of working 
cooperatively with other households and community leaders.  As summarized in the 
second part of Appendix Table 1, this indicator is created as follows.  First, 
‘number of groups’ is the number of community groups to which a household 
belongs.  This includes economic groups (such as, farmer’s groups and 
credit/finance groups), religious groups, and social groups  (such as, women’s   17 
 
groups and youth groups).  Second, ‘group characteristics’ is an additive sub-
index of various characteristics of each household’s most important group, 
including heterogeneity of members by caste and religion, heterogeneity of 
members by occupation, the nature of decision-making mechanisms, and 
effectiveness of group functioning.  The additive sub-index is increased by one 
unit if a household’s most important group has: caste groups that are 
proportionally represented; different religions that are proportionally represented; 
members with different occupations; leaders with different occupations; or 
participatory decision making.  In addition, it is increased by one unit with each 
increment in the five-point functioning rating (from ‘very poor’ to ‘excellent’).  
For example, a rating of ‘poor’ adds two units, where a rating of ‘very good’ adds 
four units.
36  The ‘social capital index’ is the product of ‘number of groups’ and 
‘group characteristics.’
37  For example, a household that belongs to two groups 
(‘number of groups’ = 2) and whose most important group has a proportional 
representation of castes, members with different occupations, and is rated as 
functioning poorly (‘group characteristics’ = 4) would have a social capital index 
of 8.
38   
Summary statistics for ‘number of groups’, ‘group characteristics’, and the 
social capital index reveal a dramatic difference in the quantity of associational 
activity in Sri Lanka and India (see Appendix Table 1).  On average, households 
in Sri Lanka belong to 2.4 groups.  In Karnataka and Maharashtra, this figure is 
0.19 and 0.49, respectively.  The means of group characteristics and the social 
capital index are: 7.48 and 25.38; 1.10 and 1.55; and 1.81 and 3.14, respectively.
39   18 
 
An alternative social capital indicator is ‘help from outsiders’, a dummy 
variable that indicates that a household could get help from non-family members 
in difficult times.  Community members that can do so are likely to have 
established productive norms and networks with neighboring households.  The 
project-level means for this indicator are 0.61, 0.62, and 0.60, respectively. 
•  The results summarized in Table 6 reveal that social capital and design 
participation are associated.  Higher household-level social capital is 
positively associated with participation in the service design.  Specifications 
(1), (3) and (5) shows a statistically significant relationship between the 
‘social capital index’ and ‘design participation’.  A one-standard deviation 
increase in the ‘social capital index is associated with increases of 0.06, 0.08 
and 0.13, respectively, in the probability of design participation (compared to 
project means for design participation of 0.84, 0.11 and 0.21).  
•  The statistically significant relationship between social capital and design 
participation survives the inclusion of other potential covariates.  Specifications 
(2), (4) and (6) reveal that the inclusion of ‘household assets’ and ‘family size’, 
with community fixed effects, does not change the basic relationship between 
the ‘social capital index’ and ‘design participation’.
40, 
41  
The robustness of these results is confirmed in two ways.  First, in all six 
specifications, replacing the ‘social capital index’ with either of its the sub-indices 
or ‘help from outsiders’ yields the same statistically significant relationship between 
a measure of social capital and design participation.
42  Second, in the two 
specifications for Sri Lanka, the only project that required household participation   19 
 
in construction, replacing the ‘design participation’ with the equivalent 
‘construction participation’ yields a statistically significant relationship (not reported 
here).  A one-standard deviation increase in the social capital index is associated 
with a 0.09 increase in the probability of construction participation.  Two of the 
three alternative social capital indicators (‘number of groups’ and ‘help from 
outsiders’) also yield statistically significant relationships.   
Also, community-level social capital is a positive and significant 
determinant of construction monitoring.  Table 8 lists results from community-
level specifications--in India and Sri Lanka, respectively--of the determinants of 
construction monitoring: in addition to the community-level social capital 
indicator, each specification includes (not shown) community-level averages of 
assets, household size and (in the case of India), a dummy variable for Karnataka.  
With two of the four indicators in Sri Lanka and three of the four indicators in 
India, community-level social capital is a positive and significant determinant of 
construction monitoring. 
  The results in this sub-section show that household-level social capital 
leads to participation in service design: in communities with effective community 
groups, participation in service design is likely to be higher.  The results from Sri 
Lanka show –that social capital also tends to increase participation in construction 
design.  Finally, social capital is positively associated with construction 
monitoring.   
D.  Magnitudes of the effect of institutions on impact  
The previous results suggest a chain of causality from institutions –(social   20 
 
capital and service rules) to project performance and impact.  This section 
calculates the implied magnitudes of the effect of institutions on service impact, 
improvement of household health and reduction of water collection time.   
The first part of Table 8 presents some calculations of such magnitudes for 
improved health.  The first row of the table presents the effect of a one-standard 
deviation increase in design participation on improved health, based on the 
underlying structural equations summarized in Tables 2 and 3.   Note that the 
three project figures, from 0.051 to 0.068, are within a plausible and fairly narrow 
range, despite the large difference in the nature of the quantity and quality of the 
underlying variables across these three projects (particularly between Sri Lanka 
and the two Indian projects).  For each project, this is calculated by multiplying 
the standard deviation of design participation with the coefficients within the 
framework that lead from ‘design participation’ to ‘design satisfaction’ (link 2) 
and from ‘design satisfaction’ to ‘improved health’ (link 1).  For example, in Sri 
Lanka, the figure is 0.051 = (.360)*(.196)*(.72), where the three respective 
multiplicands are: the standard deviation of design participation; the partial affect 
of ‘design participation’ on ‘design satisfaction’; and the partial affect of ‘design 
satisfaction’ on improved health.  The second row of the table presents 
calculations of the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in construction 
monitoring on improved health, based on similar calculations from the underlying 
structural equations.  The third row of the table presents the total of these 
magnitudes.  These figures suggest an order of magnitude for how service-level 
institutions affect improved health.  These total magnitudes translate to improved   21 
 
health for 17 to 18 households in a community of 200 households (the means 
community size in the sample) because of more design participation and better 
construction monitoring. 
The final two rows of Table 8 present similar calculations of these 
magnitudes for time-saving, based on similar underlying equations.  The 
calculations from the structural equations, from 0.012 to 0.024, are also within a 
plausible range, despite the large differences among the projects.  These 
magnitudes translate to time-saving of 9, 35, and 25 minutes, respectively, from 
more community-level design participation. 
Since both ‘design participation’ and ‘construction monitoring’ are 
endogenous in this framework (that is,  they are determined by social capital and 
other factors), another way to calculate the effect of institutions on service impact 
is with ‘reduced form’
43 estimations, where the community-level social capital 
index replaces both ‘community design satisfaction’ and ‘good quality 
construction’ in the specification tested in Table 2 and 3.  Single-stage reduced 
form estimates are consistent on the condition that: the indicators of social capital 
accurately measure the patterns of social interaction and norms of trust and 
reciprocity among water users and their neighbors; and these patterns are mostly 
exogenous to the delivery of water.   If these conditions do not hold, instrumental 
variable (IV) reduced form estimates are consistent.
44   
Table 9 presents the estimates of single- and two-stage reduced form 
models.  In single-stage estimation, probit models show that only in the case of 
Maharashtra is the village-level social capital index positive and significant    22 
 
(coefficients of 0.0269 and 0.0244 respectively).
45   
In the IV estimation, two instruments for the social capital index are used, 
based on additional survey questions about community activities.  ‘Household 
community activity’ is the community-level average of households that 
participated in a community-level activity; and ‘multiple community activities’ is 
the community-level average of households that reported multiple community 
activities.  The a priori case for using these as instruments for the social capital 
index is that more community activities are positively associated with the quality 
and quantity of associational activity, but do not have an independent effect, 
outside of this framework, on improved health.
46  
Table 9 shows that the IV results are positive and significant in the case of 
Sri Lanka and Maharashtra, with coefficients of 0.0286 and 0.0417, respectively.
47  
Using these IV results, a one-standard deviation increase of community-level 
social capital is associated with an increase 0.17 and 0.13 in the probability of 
improved health.
 48   These magnitudes are slightly larger than the sum of the 
magnitudes of design participation and construction from the structural 
equations.
49  Accordingly, the evidence from the two-stage reduced form 
equations, in two of the three projects, suggests that more social capital -- the 
critical determinant of design participation and construction monitoring -- leads to 
improved household health for about 26 to 34 households in a community of 200 
households. 
The final two rows of Table 9 present calculations from comparable OLS 
and IV estimates for time-saving.  In single-stage estimation, the village-level   23 
 
social capital index positive and significant in the cases of Sri Lanka and 
Maharashtra (coefficients of 0.0047 and 0.0916, respectively).  In the IV 
estimation, this is true of Maharashtra (0.0807).  Using the IV result, a one-
standard deviation increase of community-level social capital is associated with a 
reduction of water collection time by 26 percent.  This corresponds to daily time-
saving of about 33 minutes. 
V. Conclusion 
Using data from Sri Lanka and India, this paper has shown that well-
designed and well-constructed water services lead to improved household health 
and reduced water collection times.  The results suggest that one can promote 
well-designed services—(that is, increase user satisfaction with the service 
design) by involving community members in the design process and by letting 
community members, not outsiders, make the final decision about the service 
type.  Ensuring that communities have effective mechanisms to monitor 
household contributions to construction is in turn an effective way to promote 
well-constructed services.   
However, household participation in service design and ability to craft and 
enforce monitoring mechanisms are not automatic.  The empirical results 
presented here suggest that in communities with high levels of social capital--in 
particular, with active community groups and associations--design participation is 
more likely to be high and monitoring mechanisms are more likely to be in place.  
In those communities, households are accustomed to working together and social 
ties deter free riding.  This suggests a way to place an economic value on   24 
 
community-level social capital in the context of water projects: as the net present 
value of the marginal increase in health associated with active civic associations.
50 
What do these results, in particular the results about social capital, imply 
for designers of community-based water projects?  They do not necessarily 
suggest that projects should avoid investing in community-based water systems in 
communities with low levels of social capital.  Indeed, while many poor 
communities with the most urgent need for improved water systems are likely to 
have low levels of social capital
51, people in many of these communities are likely 
to reliably report a willingness to pay and maintain a water system.  Instead, these 
results suggest that designers of community-based water projects need to pay 
attention to the prevailing levels of social capital, as one of the factors that will 
influence the performance of the project, in communities to be served by the 
project.  When targeting these communities, the allocation of investment 
resources for water services programs may need to be adjusted to take into 
account the lack of social capital.  Possible adjustments include increased 
investments in social mobilization efforts (for example, through the strengthening 
of local organizations) and in more direct supervision by project personnel 
working in these communities to oversee system performance.
52 
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Impact and Performance of Water Services 
in Sri Lanka and India 
     
 Sri Lanka  Karnataka  Maharashtra 
     
Health Impact      
Improved health   0.36  0.45  0.54 
  (0.48) (0.50)  (0.50) 
Decreased incidence in diarrhea   0.21  0.29  0.20 
  (0.41) (0.45)  (0.40) 
Time savings impact      
Change of collection time  40.6  62.6  53.9 
  (52.7) (76.9)  (80.7) 
Design Performance      
Satisfied with service design   0.86  0.71  0.45 
  (0.35) (0.46)  (0.50) 
Construction and O&M Performance      
Good quality construction  0.66  0.74  0.26 
  (0.47) (0.44)  (0.44) 
No construction defects  0.67  0.84  0.57 
  (0.47) (0.37)  (0.50) 
Non-colored water  0.94  0.87  0.92 
  (0.24) (0.34)  (0.27) 
Non-turbid water   0.94  0.74  0.78 
  (0.23) (0.44)  (0.42) 
      
Number of households   377  290  421 
Number of communities  18  12  20 
     
Notes:      
Means and (standard deviations) of impact and performance indicators.  See 
text for more detailed description of these indicators. 
Impact and design performance indicators from household surveys;  
Construction and O&M performance indicators from water committee surveys. 
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Table 2: Determinants of improved health        
               
 Sri 
Lanka 
   Karnataka      Maharashtra 
Community-level                 
Community design satisfaction  0.72 ***    0.84 ***    0.38 *** 
  (0.26)     (0.20)      (0.09)  
Good quality construction  0.13 **    0.10      0.18 *** 
  (0.05)     (0.07)      (0.06)  
Household-level                
Hygiene class  0.13 **    0.01      0.20 *** 
  (0.05)     (0.12)      (0.05)  
Household size  0.01      -0.01      0.01   
  (0.014)     (0.006)      (0.006)  
Household assets  0.00      0.00      0.00   
  (0.003)     (0.003)      (0.002)  
               
Number of households  377      290      421   
Number of communities  18      12      20   
               
Notes:               
Dependent variable is household-level improved health.         
Probit estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).    
Estimates are marginal changes in probability of independent variable.   
Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%)   
See text for descriptions of variables.             
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Table 3: Determinants of time savings                      
               
 Sri  Lanka    Karnataka    Maharashtra 
Village-level              
Community design satisfaction  1.63 *    2.92 ***  1.06 *** 
  (0.95)     (0.95)     (0.38)   
Household-level                
Hygiene class  0.06     -0.36      0.77 *** 
  (0.22)     (0.62)     (0.23)   
Household size  -0.056      -0.047 *    0.015   
  (0.062)     (0.028)     (0.032)   
Household assets  -0.002      0.014      0.000   
  (0.012)     (0.011)     (0.011)   
               
Number of households  288     188     249  
Number of communities  18     12     20  
               
Notes:               
Dependent variable is the log of household-level time-saving.       
OLS estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).    
See text for descriptions of variables.                      
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Table 4: Institutional determinants of satisfaction with service design     
             
   Sri Lanka   Karnataka   Maharashtra   
               
  Local  initiation  0.063   0.049   -0.126     
   (0.040)  (0.087)  (0.100)     
 Design participation  0.196 *** 0.253 **  0.419 ***   
   (0.094)  (0.069)  (0.096)    
 Local decision-making  0.191 *** 0.322 *** 0.540 ***   
   (0.055)  (0.086)  (0.128)    
 Community fixed effects  Yes    Yes    Yes     
              
 Number of households  336    265    381     
 Number of communities  16    11    18     
              
Notes:            
Dependent variable is household satisfaction with the design of the water system. 
Multivariate probit estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).  
Estimates are for discrete changes of independent dummy variables.     
Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%)   
See text for descriptions of variables.             
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Table 5: Institutional determinants of good quality construction 
          
   Specifications     
        (1)        (2)     
            
Construction monitoring    1.02 ***  -     
   (0.37)         
Construction sanctions    -    -0.07     
       (0.27)     
Karnataka dummy    0.40 *  0.08     
   (0.17)    (0.20)     
Maharashtra dummy    0.33    -0.39 **   
   (0.26)    (0.17)     
            
Notes:            
Dependent variable is 'good quality construction'. Sample size is 50. 
Probit estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).  
Estimates are marginal changes in probability of independent variable. 
Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%)   
See text for descriptions of variables.           
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Table 6: Determinants of participation in service design            
                    
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   
 Sri  Lanka  Karnataka  Maharashtra 
Household indicators               
 Social capital index  0.0040 *** 0.0053 *** 0.0182 *** 0.0148 *** 0.0181 *** 0.0142 *** 
   (0.0016)   (0.0017)   (0.0049)   (0.0043)   (0.0035)   (0.0044)   
 Household assets     -0.0022      0.0038  **     0.0022   
      (0.0019)      (0.0013)      (0.0023)   
 Household size     0.0005      0.0132      0.0000   
      (0.0098)      (0.0025)      (0.0055)   
 Community fixed effects   No   Yes   No   Yes   No   Yes   
                     
 Number of households  367   367   290    264    421    315   
 Number of communities  18   18   12    11    20    15   
                      
Notes:                     
Dependent variable is household participation in the design of water system.         
Probit estimation, with Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).            
Estimates are marginal changes in probability of independent variable.           
Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%)           
See text for descriptions of variables.                     
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Table 7: Determinants of construction monitoring 
          
Social capital 
indicator 
        
Sri Lanka (n=18)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   









 0.014  0.095  0.283*** 1.006***  
 (0.011)  (0.094)  (0.111)  (0.312)   
          
India (n=32)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)   









 0.031***  0.164*** 0.063*** 0.0401  
 (0.008)  (0.050)  (0.016)  (0.144)   
 
Notes: OLS estimation, with standard errors (in parentheses).  
Results from other independent variables not reported.   
Estimates are marginal changes in probability of independent variable.   
Significance levels are: *** (.99%); ** (.95%); * (.90%)   
See text for descriptions of variables.         
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Table 8: The effect of selected institutions on the impacts of water projects       
     Sri  Lanka  Karnataka  Maharashtra 
Improved health         
   Design participation  0.051  0.068  0.065  
   Construction monitoring  0.037  0.021  0.017  
   Total  0.088 0.089 0.083  
               
Time savings          
   Design participation  0.115 0.236 0.182  
           
                     
Alternative measures of the change of impacts based on a one-standard deviation change of 
institutional determinants. 
  
See text for descriptions of the underlying models and the calculation of the magnitudes.       
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Table 9: The effect of social capital on the impacts of water projects             
              
Impact indicator Estimation 
Procedure 
Sri Lanka Karnataka Maharashtra 
Improved health              
  Probit 0.0047    -0.0325    0.0269 *** 




0.0286 *** 0.0033    0.0417 *** 
   (0.0076)    (0.0422)    (0.0100)   
              
Time savings               
  OLS 0.0047  *** 0.0718    0.0916 ***   




-0.0004   0.2747    0.0807 *** 
 
   (0.0304)    (0.2757)    (0.0378)   
              
Notes: Reduced form estimates of the determinants of impact of water services.     
Indepent variable is the 'social capital index.'     
Results from other independent variables (as in Table 2) not reported.         
Huber-adjusted standard errors (in parentheses).    
See text for descriptions of variables.   




Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics for determinants of improved 
health and indicators of social capital 
       
   Sri Lanka  Karnataka  Maharashtra 
Determinants of improved health       
 Village-level       
 Good  design  0.86  0.71  0.45 
   (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.30) 
  Good quality construction  0.66  0.74  0.26 
   (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.44) 
 Household-level       
 Hygiene  class  0.41  0.08  0.33 
   (0.49)  (0.27)  (0.47) 
 Household  size  1.65  2.69  2.70 
   (3.17)  (1.80)  (2.43) 
 Household  assets  10.70  12.96  7.72 
   (9.81)  (11.84)  (10.51) 
Indicators of social capital      
  Number of groups  2.41  0.19  0.49 
    (1.63) (0.56)  (1.04) 
  Group characteristics   7.48  1.1  1.81 
    (1.55) (2.64)  (3.07) 
  Social capital index  25.38  1.55  3.14 
    (14.05) (4.61)  (6.99) 
  Help from outsiders  0.61  0.62  0.6 
    (0.49) (0.49)  (0.49) 
        
  Number of households  377  290  421 
  Number of communities  18  12  20 
        
Notes:       
Means and (standard deviations) for selected variables. 
Means of group characteristics among households that belonged to groups 
are 7.56, 7.23 and 6.47, respectively; means of the social capital index 
among households that belonged to groups are 25.65, 10.47 and 11.41, 
respectively. 
See text for descriptions of variables.         35 
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Notes 
* This paper was prepared as a background paper for two impact evaluation studies by the 
Operations Evaluation Department (OED), The World Bank.  We would like to thank: Robert 
Picciotto and Roger Slade for the opportunity to participate in this study; Tauno Skytta and Ron 
Parker for their guidance of the impact evaluation studies and their critiques of the first draft of this 
paper; the staffs of ORG-MARG SMART in Sri Lanka and of ORG-MARG in India for 
implementing the surveys and providing the material for the case studies; Jeremy Highsmith for 
research assistance.  We also thank Madhur Gautam (OED peer reviewer), Warren Van Wicklin 
(OED peer reviewer), Omar Azfar, Christiaan Grootaert, Mike Garn, Shahrukh Khan, Margaret 
Madajewicz, Timi Mayer, Meghan O’Sullivan, Lant Pritchett, T.N Srinivasan, Thierry van 
Bastelaer, Michael Woolcock, participants of the Conference on Democracy and Development at 
Middlebury College, and an anonymous referee for their comments and criticisms of a previous 
draft.  Finally, we fondly remember Mancur Olson for his leadership and friendship.  
1 For a review of the poor performance of the top-down approach and the economic 
underpinnings of the new community-based approach, see John Briscoe and Harvey A. Garn, 
“Financing water supply and sanitation under Agenda 21,” Natural Resources Forum, 19 (1) 
(1995): 59-70; and Harvey A. Garn, “An Institutional Framework for Community Water Supply 
and Sanitation Services,” mimeographed. (Washington, DC: The World Bank).  
2 Community Water Supply and Sanitation Project (Cr. 2442-CE) in Sri Lanka; 
Maharashtra Rural Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation Project (Cr. 2234-IN); and   36 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Karnataka Rural Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation Project (Cr. 2483-IN).   
3 As discussed, for example, in Gabrielle Watson and N. Vijay Jagannathan, 
“Participation in Water,” Environment Department Papers Participation Series (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 1995); and World Bank, “Paraguay Impact Evaluation Report: Community-Based 
Rural Water Systems and the Development of Village Communities,” (Washington, DC: World 
Bank, 1998).  
4 In doing so, it builds on the survey instruments and evaluation approaches for water 
projects found in Deepa Narayan, “The Contribution of People’s Participation: Evidence from 121 
Rural Water Projects,” ESD Occasional Paper Series 1 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995); 
Jonathan Isham, Deepa Narayan, and Lant Pritchett, “Does Participation Improve Performance?: 
Establishing Causality with Subjective Data,” World Bank Economic Review 9 (2) (1995): 175-
200;  Jennifer Sara, and Travis Katz, “Making Rural Water Supply Sustainable: Report on the 
Impact of Project Rules,” (Washington, DC: UNDP/World Bank Water Program, 1998); and for 
social capital found in Deepa Narayan , and Lant Pritchett, “Cents and Sociability: Income and 
Social Capital in Rural Tanzania,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 47(4) (1999): 
871-97; and Christian Grootaert, “Social Capital, Household Welfare and Poverty in Indonesia,” 
mimeographed (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).  For a comparable study, see Jonathan 
Isham and Satu Kähkönen, “How Do Participation and Social Capital Affect Community-Based 
Water Projects?  Evidence from Central Java, Indonesia.”  Forthcoming in Social Capital and 
Development, Christiaan Grootaert and Thierry Van Bastelaer, Eds. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
5 See World Bank, “India Impact Evaluation Report: Comparative Review of Rural Water 
Systems Experience,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); and World Bank, “Sri Lanka Impact 
Evaluation Report,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998) for details. 
6 Communities were selected randomly from a list of all communities that had had access 
to potable water through the project for at least a year.  The survey was carried out in 68 
communities, but 18 of these had to be dropped from the analysis in this paper because of 
incomplete answers or absence of water committees.  All these communities were in India.     
Neighborhoods and households to be polled were selected randomly.  The interviews were 
conducted at times that were convenient to the villagers to ensure maximum participation of both 
women and men.  In some communities the water committee was part of the local government. 
7 Practitioners in the delivery of water and sanitation services typically highlight health 
improvements and time savings as the principle household-level impacts (for a good summary, see 
John Briscoe, “When the Cups Half Full: Improving Water and Sanitation Services in the 
Developing World,” Environment, May 1993, 35(4) (1993): 6 – 20.  Briscoe notes that new 
economic opportunities can be another important impact of water services: the surveys of these 
three projects found that less than 3 percent of households reported that they had started new 
economic activities since the implementation of the service.   Alternatively, could can use 
measures of efficiency -- such as the relative unit cost of the linear length of a water supply 
network.  We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that we also use time-saving as a 
household-level impact indicator. 
8 To verify the impact of the new service on household health, households in Karnataka 
and Maharashtra that did not use the new water service were also surveyed as a control group.  The 
results show marked differences in the incidence of diarrhea among the users and non-users of 
project-financed water services.  At the time of the survey, five percent of households using new 
water systems in Karnataka and 15 percent using new water systems in Maharashtra had suffered 
diarrhea in the past two weeks, while the incidence of diarrhea among non-users was 13 percent in 
Karnataka and 23 percent in Maharashtra.  
9 World Bank, “India Impact Evaluation Report: Comparative Review of Rural Water 
Systems Experience,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); and World Bank, “Sri Lanka Impact 
Evaluation Report,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998). 
10 Institutions are often confused with organizations because of the use of the word 
“institution” in this sense in common parlance.  The basic concept of institutions in economics is,   37 
 
                                                                                                                                     
however, something more fundamental than organizations.  Institutions are the rules and practices 
that coordinate the actions of individuals in an organization.  Examples in the context of an 
organization are rules about hiring and firing and about performance monitoring.  For a 
comprehensive analyses of how institutions, defined as they are in this paper, can affect 
development outcomes, see Robert Picciotto, “Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From 
Participation to Governance,” Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance 
in Less-Developed and Post-Socialist Societies, ed. Christopher Clague (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997); and World Bank, World Development Report, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997). 
11 For a detailed discussion of crafting service rules in the context of irrigation projects, 
see Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, (San Francisco: 
ICS Press, 1992). 
12 In a global study on the performance of community-based water systems in Benin, 
Bolivia, Honduras, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Uganda, Sara and Katz found that unless the service 
rules gave all community members a chance to express their preferences about service, community 
representatives often failed to consider the demand of certain segments of the population, such as 
women or the poor.  In addition, unless there were adequate monitoring and sanctioning 
mechanisms, community representatives often did not act in good faith. 
13 Michael Woolcock, “Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical 
Synthesis and Policy Framework,” Theory and Society, 27 (2) (1998): 151-208, presents a multi-
disciplinary synthesis of social capital and economic development. Paul Collier, “Social Capital 
and Poverty,” The Social Capital Initiative: Working Paper No. 4 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 
1998), presents a clear and concise economic framework for how social capital can affect a variety 
of development outcomes.  Jonathan Isham, Thomas Kelly, and Sunder Ramaswamy (editors), 
Social Capital, Economic Development and the Environment, Edward Elgar Publications 
(forthcoming)  present a collection of theoretical and empirical essays on social capital and 
development and environmental outcomes. 
14 Though not explicitly shown in the diagram, governmental and NGO institutions and 
non-institutional determinants (for example, enrollment in hygiene classes) may also directly affect 
service performance and impact. 
15 Empirical studies on irrigation management by Robert Wade, Village Republics: 
Economic Conditions for Collective Action in South India, (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1994); and 
Normal Uphoff, M.L. Wickramasinghe, and C.M. Wijayaratna, “Optimum Participation in 
Irrigation Management: Issues and Evidence from Sri Lanka,” Human Organization 49 (1) (1990); 
indicate that households are likely to act collectively in irrigation projects where they face 
sufficient water scarcity and are assured that organization could make a substantial difference in 
their yields.  According to Uphoff, households in the middle range of the irrigation system, where 
water is neither abundant (as in the head-end of the system) nor absolutely scarce (as in the tail-end 
of the system) and thus returns to cooperation high, are most likely to act collectively.  While there 
were no data available to test the impact of community-level water scarcity on household-level 
participation in this paper, we do allow for this possibility in the estimation procedures below by 
testing for community-level fixed effects. 
16 Since no quantitative data on governmental and NGO institutions were collected, this 
paper does not provide empirical evidence of their significance.  Qualitative evidence on the 
importance of governmental and NGO institutions for service performance is found in the two case 
studies in Section II. 
17 Using the notation in equation (1), let ‘improved health’ be relabeled Hij, so that Hij = 1 
if Hij* > 0 and Hij = 0 if Hij* ≤  0.  Probit estimation is used here: in no case does using other 
techniques for analyzing dichotomous dependent variables, including linear probability or logit 
analysis, alter the fundamental results reported below.  
18 As in Narayan and Pritchett, we build a composite index of household wealth from a 
weighted sum of household durable goods such as radios, refrigerators, and sewing machines.  It is 
also possible to use self-reported consumption expenditures as a proxy for long-run household   38 
 
                                                                                                                                     
economic status; Deon Filmer, and Lant H. Pritchett, “Estimating Wealth Effects with Expenditure 
Data—or Tears: With an Application to Educational Enrollments in States of India,” World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1998, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); argue that an 
asset index works better than consumption expenditures as this proxy. 
19  The econometric procedures in this section use the following guidelines, except where 
noted in the text.  First, because of the differences in project design discussed in Section II (and the 
likelihood of region-specific omitted variables), all econometric results are reported by project.  
Second, all results use household-level dependent variables.  Third, since heteroskedasticity (non-
constant variance of the error term) is likely in the underlying econometric equations, all results are 
reported with Huber-adjusted standard errors.  We thank Chris Grootaert for his suggestions in this 
regard. 
20 These results on ‘community design satisfaction’ could be biased upward due to reverse 
causality if improved household health leads the household to report that they are satisfied with 
project design.  To test for this possibility, ‘community design satisfaction’ was replaced with 
“neighbors’ design satisfaction”, the share of all other community members that were satisfied with 
the project design.  In similar specifications, the respective coefficients for this variable are 0.67, 
0.77, and 0.37, all at significance levels greater than 0.99%. 
21 In Karnataka, the magnitude of the coefficient is similar to that of the other projects, but 
the significance level is much lower. Evaluation of the data gathering in Karnataka suggests that 
there is large measurement error, another justification for separating the results by project.   
22 Similar results can generally be shown using a set of alternative measures of 
construction quality based on more detailed questions (for example, ‘leakage in networks’ and 
‘frequent system failures’).  
23 The latter result may be subject to reporting bias.  It is possible that households who 
have taken a class will report ‘improved health’, even when an objective analysis would show no 
measurable improvements. 
24 For example, number of children in the household and self-reported household income 
and expenditures. 
25 One possible objection to these results is that the self-reported ‘improved health’ 
variable is not an accurate indicator of the project impact.   Within each project, self-reported 
‘improved health’ is positively correlated (at the 10 percent significance level or better) with most 
of the other impact and performance indicators in Table 1, including the performance indicators 
from the technical assessments.  The exceptions are ‘change of collection time’ in Sri Lanka, ‘no 
construction defects’ in Karnataka, and ‘non-colored water’ in Sri Lanka and Karnataka. 
26 Since household-level time-saving depend primarily on community-wide decisions 
made during service design about the location of the water services, it is not necessary to include 
Cj , the measure of construction performance in community j, in this model.  Inclusion of 
‘construction  monitoring’ in the estimations reported below (not reported here) does not 
significantly change the overall results on ‘design participation’ and the other independent 
variables. 
27 For example, β 1  ( = ∂  ln(time savings)/∂  Dj,) is the percentage change in time savings 
associated with a marginal change in design performance.  (These relationships are not expressed 
as elasticities to facilitate the comparison between the magnitudes of health impact results.)     
Another way to account for the difference in initial conditions (which gives similar results as those 
reported below) is to use time-saving (in minutes) as the dependent variable and to include the pre-
project collection time as an independent variable.   
28 It is hard to know what to make of the result on ‘hygiene class’ in Maharashtra (where   
enrollment in a hygiene class is associated with a decrease of collection time of 77 percent). 
29 While many case studies support these overall findings, there is a surprising lack of 
empirical studies that test the basic determinants of performance of community-based water 
services.  The approach used here does build on the survey instruments and some of the findings of 
Narayan and Sara and Katz. 
30 The summary statistics for these variables underline the different approaches to service   39 
 
                                                                                                                                     
design across each project, as discussed in Section II.  In particular, the means for ‘design 
participation’ (0.84, 0.11, 0.21, respectively) and ‘local decision-making’ (0.72, 0.56, 0.30, 
respectively) confirm that the Sri Lanka project was the most participatory in terms of soliciting local 
opinions and giving community members a voice in the design process. 
31 Note that the sample sizes in these specifications are smaller than in Table 2 because 
they use community fixed effects and in two communities in Sri Lanka, one community in 
Karnataka and two communities in Maharashtra, there is no household that that reported 
satisfaction with project design. 
32 In this context, it would have been helpful to know whether households fully 
understood the financial obligations that they incurred by the choice of one system over another.  
However, data to analyze this were not available. 
33 The means and (standard deviations) for ‘construction monitoring’ and ‘construction 
sanctions’ are 0.43 (0.37) and 0.20 (0,29), respectively.  Even though not required by project 
design, some households in India--particularly in Karnataka--reported contributing cash or labor to 
service construction and noted the existence of monitoring and sanctioning of these contributions.  
34 This may reflect the fact that only a small share of households in each community 
reported that sanctions were imposed on non-contributors.  Most households stated that even 
though there may have been rules about sanctions, nothing in practice happened to non-
contributors.  The rules about sanctions were never enforced.  Another possibility is that informal 
social sanctions, in the presence of effective monitoring, are a constraint against household free 
riding. 
35 Intensity of design participation would be measured, for example, by hours per 
household.  As pointed out by a peer reviewer, this is to be distinguished from the quality of 
participation.  
36 As discussed below, a household that reports no group affiliation receives a value of 0 
for this sub-index. 
37 Notwithstanding the obvious difficulties in trying to capture in a common metric the 
very different phenomena of group heterogeneity, participation, and functioning, this type of index 
(as in Narayan and Pritchett) attempts to identify, from microeconomic data, characteristics of 
social capital that have been shown to be important elsewhere, including: Milton Esman, and 
Norman Uphoff, Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984); and Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993); See the discussions in Narayan and Pritchett and Grootaert on the pros 
and cons of using an index of social capital. In particular, Grootaert makes the point that using this 
kind of multiplicative index means that the group characteristics act like a productivity shifter for 
the number of groups 
38 The use of an additive sub-index based solely on the survey questions assigns, by 
default, a relative weight to the value of each question.  As in Narayan and Pritchett, we 
experimented with different weights for the questions that comprise ‘group characteristics’, 
including weights generated from factor analysis.  Since the use of different weights did not 
dramatically change the overall results, we retain these ‘default’ weights.  
39 These village-level means are much lower in Karnataka and Maharashtra since both 
group characteristics and the social capital index take on the value of 0 when a household has no 
group membership.  As noted in Appendix Table 1, the means of group characteristics among 
households that belonged to groups are 7.56, 7.23 and 6.47, respectively; the means of the social 
capital index among households that belonged to groups are 25.65, 10.47 and 11.41, respectively.  
These differences show that groups in Sri Lanka and Karnataka are slightly more heterogeneous, 
participatory, and effective than those in Maharashtra; and that the index of social capital is more 
than twice as large among households that belonged to groups in Sri Lanka compared to India 
40 Using community-level fixed effects means that these specifications are capturing the 
household-level effect of social capital on design participation, controlling for the possible effect of a 
vector of community-level variables Xj that could affect the participation decision.  Note that the 
sample sizes in specifications 4 and 6 are smaller because in one community in Karnataka and five   40 
 
                                                                                                                                     
communities in Maharashtra, there is no household that that reported participating in project 
design. 
41 It is important to verify that the results reported in this table are not overly biased by the 
way that the social capital index is constructed--with a 0 assigned to all households without any 
group membership.  Sets of alternative specifications with only households that report group 
membership (not reported here) show very similar results.  The one exception is an alternative 
specification (6) among 94 households in Maharashtra, where the coefficient is positive (0.0029) 
but insignificant.  
42 These supplementary results are not reported here. The notable exception is ‘help from 
outsiders’ in Maharashtra, with a negative marginal effect and a p-value of 0.06. 
43 A reduced form model attempts to use only truly exogenous independent variables as 
potential determinants.    
44 Both the single- and two-stage reduced from models proposed here also have the 
underlying assumption that most of the effect of social capital occurs through  ‘design 
participation’ and ‘construction monitoring’ not other service level rules that are uncorrelated with 
these two.  
45 The same results can be derived using a linear probability model (which serves as a 
reference for the subsequent instrumental variables estimation with improved health.  
46 More technically, these community-level variables are ‘good’ instruments if they are 
positively correlated with the social capital index and are not strongly correlated with the error 
term in the reduced form equation.  The pairwise correlation coefficients between community-level 
social capital index and ‘household community activity’ and ‘multiple community activities’ are 
0.83 and 0.76, respectively. 
47 It also shows that the test for over-identifying restrictions can be rejected (p-values of 
0.83 and 0.16, respectively).  Similar results can be generated using the two-stage method of 
Whitney Newey, “Efficient Estimation of Limited Dependent Variables Models with Endogenous 
Explanatory Variables, Journal of Ecomonetrics (36) (1987), 231 – 250.  
48 In the previous draft of this paper, this change in the probability of improved health was 
calculated by multiplying the coefficients of ‘household community activity’ and ‘multiple 
community activities’ in the first stage (where the dependent variable is the social capital index) 
times their respective standard deviations, and then multiplying the sum of these terms times the 
coefficient on the social capital index in the second stage (where the dependent variable is 
improved health).  We thank numerous readers and seminar participants for suggesting this more 
parsimonious method.  
49 The divergence between the results from the structural equations and the reduced form 
in Karnataka (in both parts of this table) may be due to the fact that, as previously noted, there 
were larger errors associated with the data collection in Karnataka. 
50 See Collier for a general discussion of this point.   
51 For empirical evidence of this general result, see Narayan and Pritchett and Grootaert. 
52 For more on this last point, see Jonathan Isham, “Can Investments in Social Capital 
Improve Local Development and Environmental Outcomes?  A Cost-Benefit Framework to Assess 
the Policy Options,” in Isham, Kelly and Ramaswamy, Eds. 